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Abstract
The European Union (EU) wants to finance part of the EU budget with a European tax which
citizens would pay directly to the Union. One option is a communication tax. After a brief view
of the finances of the EU and the history of the idea of taxing communication, the note states
the criteria used in selecting a EU tax. After an assessment according to the criteria, the article
concludes that at this moment a European internet communication tax is not a viable option. For the
citizen, it is a visible and equitable tax that does not distort economic decision-making. However,
it makes hardly any sense from the point of view of the other budgetary, efficiency, and political
criteria. To reform this situation, an EU policy on information and communication technologies is
planned, including the dedication of resources to an EU-wide infrastructure and digital networks,
which could make taxation of communictions at the EU level a more feasible option. However, the
technical aspects of taxing the Internet and other media – which are, at present, hardly discussed –
may still prove to be significant barriers to such a policy.
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Introduction 
 
In July 2011 the European Union (EU) started decision making on the 
multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the period 2014–2020, based on a 
proposal by the European Commission (2010a; 2011a). One of the EU’s goals in 
view of the EU budget has always been to supply itself with new own resources 
through a European tax. These taxes, paid directly to the Union by citizens, and 
not requiring any subsequent decision by national authorities, are required to 
make the Union less dependent on the direct contributions of Member States. 
With an EU tax, too, a direct link between citizens and the EU is wrought. Over 
the years, the Union has evolved from a bond between states to a bond between 
states and the citizens thereof. One proposal to finance the budget that has 
cropped up many times over the years is to tax communication services. The EU 
thought first of taxing telephone landlines; a more recent idea of the chairman of 
the European Parliament’s budget committee, Alain Lamassoure, has been to tax 
each email by €0.00001. 
This research note investigates the viability of an Internet communication 
tax as a tax to finance the EU budget.1 Technically the communication taxation 
mechanism and hence its specific economic impact have not yet been addressed 
by the Union. The next section provides a short introduction to the history and 
present problem of the EU’s own resources. An outline of the history of the idea 
to finance a part of the budget through a communication tax is presented next, 
followed by a discussion on the suitability of taxing Internet communications 
services as a new own resource. 
 
 
The Own Resources of the European Union 
 
At the time of the EU’s founding in 1958, it was financed by direct contributions 
from its Member States. The EU has always sought, however, financial sources 
that are separate and independent of the Member States. The EU, indeed, 
eventually got its own resources, being financed in the early 1980s by agricultural 
                                                 
1
 The tax is meant to finance the budget of the European Union, and not to help to finance the 
possible fiscal debt default of some Member States. Another candidate tax, however, the Financial 
Transaction Tax (FTT) is mentioned as a possible means to finance the budget as well as the fiscal 
debt of Member States. The use of an FTT for the last purpose is motivated by fact that the 
financial sector partly caused the current crisis and has the deep pocket to pay for it: this cannot be 
a reason for a communication tax. The main reason against using a communication tax for this 
purpose is that to finance fiscal debt through a communication tax would stifle the creation of one 
internal communication market with a free flow of ideas, since the amount involved would be 
huge (the Greek debt alone being about three times the whole EU budget). A communication tax is 
likely to have to furnish about 20 percent (€25 billion) of the EU budget. 
1
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levies, customs duties, and a percentage of a harmonized value-added tax (VAT) 
base. However, as a result of a growing budget and dwindling custom duties 
because of free trade, only a quarter of the EU budget is currently financed by 
own resources; the revenues are mainly from Member States’ contributions, at 
about 1 percent of their gross national product (GNP). The EU budget for 2011 is 
€124 billion. 
A disadvantage (from the EU’s point of view) of direct contributions from 
Member States, however, is that it encourages them in so-called juste retour 
behavior—they look at what they give to the Union, and what they get in return 
(Richter 2008). This results in a stifling of expenses that have a real added value 
to the EU as a whole, for example, energy security, European infrastructure, and a 
knowledge-led service economy. The bulk of the EU’s current expenses, almost 
80 percent, is represented by agricultural subsidies and income redistribution 
among Member States. To curtail the Member States’ focus on their net 
contributions, the EU wants new, so-called, “true” own resources, supplied 
through a European tax, an idea endorsed in studies by the European Commission 
(1998; 2004) and the European Parliament (1997; 2007; 2009). A communication 
tax has nearly always been mentioned as a possible candidate tax, as recently as 
2009 (European Commission 2009). 
 
 
From a Fixed Tax on Telephone Landlines to a Tax on Email 
 
Communication charges as a source of EU revenue were first mentioned in a 1997 
study and later in a book by Begg and Grimwade (1998).2 The study was used in a 
report by the European Parliament (1997) in which communication charges were 
also mentioned as a possible new source of revenue. Given that the 
communication sector had profited in general from the creation of a single 
internal market, a communication tax of a fixed amount per telephone line seemed 
reasonable to the Parliament. The tax would, if introduced, be clearly identified 
on the bills paid by consumers, and raised at the operator level. This 
communication tax was the Parliament’s second preference as a possible new own 
resource; the Parliament’s preferred option (based on the 13 it chose to consider) 
was for consumers to pay a portion of the existing VAT directly to the EU.3 A tax 
                                                 
2
 This tax is meant to become a new own resource. It has nothing to do with the need of adapting 
existing tax regimes, by a so-called bit-tax because of growing intangible global information 
transactions (HLEG 1997).  
3
 This EU VAT is not to be confused with the present EU VAT-based own resource. The first is a 
contribution from consumers to the EU, which appears on every receipt. The latter is a statistical 
aggregate; the Member States pay part of their contribution to the Union on this basis. Other 
taxing options, with a far lower rating, were a European personal income tax, a European 
2
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on telecommunication services also came up as the second preference on a 
European Commission (1998) list of possible taxes a year later. The perceived 
advantages were its visibility to citizens, and revenues that were correlated with 
GNP growth and consistent with the equity rationale of proportional taxation. It 
was estimated that, if carried out, it would provide 10 percent of the EU’s budget 
through a tax of ECU 40 on each telephone line. 
Subsequent studies undertaken by the European Commission (Begg et al. 
2008; Cattoir 2004) and European Parliament (2007) also make mention of a 
possible communication tax. However, it had became clear over the intervening 
years that telephone landlines were not the future, and attention shifted in these 
studies to the Internet as a potential tax base. They emphasized that the distortion 
on economic decision making would be minimal, and that because of the growth 
in communication, revenues would be substantial. Alain Lamassoure, MEP and 
rapporteur for the budget, provided the most concrete suggestion. He considered 
taxation of email to be the next obvious step in an economic evolution: “In the 
agricultural era, we invented land tax, and in the era of commerce we invented 
customs taxes. Since we are now in the digital era, our system of taxation should 
reflect that change.” He suggested a 1.5 cent tax on SMS messages and a tax of 
€0.00001 levied on each email sent (Beunderman 2006).4 With the tax set that 
low, it could safely be predicted that (as emphasized in the above studies) the 
distortion on economic decision making would indeed be minimal, and that no 
citizen would change their behavior as a result of the tax. In the study by Begg et 
al. (2008) the Commission also emphasized the low price elasticity of demand for 
mobile telephone, implying that consumers, as was intended by the Commission, 
would pay the tax.5 
The reactions to Lamassoure’s proposal were, however, overwhelmingly 
negative: both from the general public and Internet users, as well as from the 
phone companies and Internet service providers (ISPs)—the companies that 
would be most affected by being turned into tax collectors. The Secretary General 
of the European Internet Service Providers’ Association, Richard Nash, 
commented that it would fly in the face of principles the EU had been trying to 
support in order to encourage technology growth (Crampton 2006). Mark Smith, a 
spokesperson for the GSM Association, which represents phone carriers, 
                                                                                                                                     
corporate income tax, a CO2/energy tax, excise duties on tobacco and alcohol, and printing of 
banknotes by the European Central Bank. 
4
 Given the number of SMS sent in the Netherlands in 2009, the EU revenues from the 
Netherlands would have been €130 million (Opta 2009). The number of emails sent worldwide, 
including the 40 percent that are spam, exceeded 60 billion a day in 2006 (Crampton 2006). 
5
 Given that the information and communication technology (ICT) sector is directly responsible 
for 5 percent of European gross domestic product (GDP), with an annual market value of €660 
billion (European Commission 2010b) it is highly unlikely that the tax (probably about €25 billion) 
could be shifted to the ICT sector; the sector is simply too small to bear the burden. 
3
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commented that the tax would disproportionally affect those least able to pay, i.e., 
the young (Crampton 2006). Oxford University Professor of Internet Governance 
and Regulation, Jonathan Zittrain, also observed that since the usefulness of a 
communication network increases for every user with each new user added, it is 
advantageous for governments to subsidize—not to tax (Crampton 2006). 
However, given it is also possible to see the tax as a potential means to control 
spam, some technology advisers have also suggested that senders should pay on a 
graded scale: friends should not pay to send an email, for example, but those who 
do not know the recipient, such as companies that send promotional email, should 
indeed pay (Crampton 2006). 
 
 
The Criteria for a Communication Tax 
 
The criteria used by the EU to evaluate a new EU tax can be summarized as 
budgetary (sufficiency; stability); efficiency (visibility; operating costs; efficient 
allocation of resources); equity (horizontal and vertical; fair contributions of the 
Member States); and political (consensus among Member States; upholding of 
Member States’ fiscal sovereignty; does an EU tax create a Leviathan?). As 
emphasized by the European Parliament (2007), any new EU tax must not 
increase overall public expenditure or the tax burden for citizens. So should a new 
system allocate part of a tax directly to the EU, an equivalent reduction would 
need to take place elsewhere. While the EU is currently considering some well-
developed options for an EU tax (such as an EU VAT), other options, such as a 
communication tax, are still at an early stage of development. The technical 
aspects of a communication taxation mechanism, and hence its specific economic 
impact, have not yet been addressed by the Union.  
 
 
General Assessment 
 
The first problem in assessing a communication tax as a new own resource to 
finance the EU’s budget, is that the EU has come up with an endless list of criteria 
to be fulfilled by any new European tax. While these criteria have to be reconciled 
with each other for an overall result, the problem (and one the EU is well aware of) 
is that no tax can fulfill all the required, and often contradictory, criteria. The 
biggest problem is the quality of the legislative process.6 Quality is a matter of 
legality (Voermans 2009, 393), but it is also related to the legislative process 
                                                 
6
 See the ongoing Better Regulation project initiated by the European Commission in 2001 
(http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/transp_eu_law_en.htm). 
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(Radaelli 2004). We therefore need to look at the mechanisms by which the social 
process and the pertaining content of the proposed tax are guaranteed: do all 
parties participate in the process and can their expectations be fulfilled? These 
qualities are impossible to fulfill with the EU’s current shopping list of criteria, 
and the probable result will be an ad hoc political choice. However, for a rational 
discussion to take place, and in order to fulfill the quality demands of national and 
international legislation, a manageable list of criteria is necessary.7 
 The second problem is that Member States interpret a European tax as a 
loss of fiscal sovereignty. It is for this reason that the European Parliament (2007) 
emphasized that “fiscal sovereignty will remain with the Member States who 
might, however, authorize the Union, for a limited period to be revoked at any 
time, to benefit directly from a certain share of a tax.” From an economic point, 
however, the eternal socialization of an asset’s return is the same as the 
socialization of the asset itself (Sinn and Feist 2000). Mutatis mutandis, the same 
goes for the temporary pooling of taxation revenue. 
 Besides these two principal problems, there is the practical problem of the 
toughness of the procedure required by the Lisbon Treaty (2008) in order to 
introduce a European tax. Not only does the European Council have to decide 
unanimously; the Parliaments of all 27 Member States have to agree too. Belafi 
(2006), however, indicates the possibility of an exchange; i.e., although some 
Member States do not like the idea of a European tax, they could change their 
opinion if something changed in their interest on the expenditure side. For 
example, France once fiercely opposed the introduction of EU custom duties and 
agricultural levies, which it interpreted as a loss of fiscal sovereignty. After 
several years, however, their biggest interest became the common agricultural 
policy, which was subsidizing French farmers in particular. As a result of this, 
France reversed its opposition to the introduction of the EU’s first true own 
resources. 
 
 
Specific Assessment 
 
In all the relevant studies (European Commission 2004; European Parliament 
1997), the real-life visibility (i.e., transparency) of a communication tax to 
consumers is emphasized. Remember the previously mentioned overwhelming 
massive, negative, reactions by Internet users and providers to Lamassoure’s idea 
for a small tax on a very large number of emails. Rationally, for a tax of €0.00001, 
at least no consumer should be worried; it would also come down to a very small 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Heinemann, Mohl, and Osterloh (2008) and Begg (2011) for suggestions on 
how to tackle the problem. 
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tax on Internet businesses. This too gives the reason for the economic efficiency 
of an email tax: it does not distort economic decision making. As far as the 
growth in yields and equity go, Begg and Grimwade (1998) have stated that 
because telecommunication services are highly correlated with expanding 
economic activity, the tax could be expected to generate growing yields. At the 
personal level, it seems likely that telecommunications services also increase with 
incomes (European Commission 2004). Therefore communication taxation would 
appear to be in line with vertical equity: the higher the one’s income, the more the 
one pays. The tax is also evenly spread geographically across the EU. In practice, 
however, we must doubt if equity will exist between the citizens in the different 
Member States; tax morality and the quality of national tax administrations differ 
too much: consumers in some Member States will pay the tax, other consumers 
will not (Schneider 2007, 20). 
In the past, the EU has felt confident in proposing taxation of older 
communication services. Because the EU created the environment for the growth 
of these services, the tax had a clear link to the common EU policy of the creation 
of one internal market. This argument is hardly convincing, however, and it is so 
general that it would allow for the introduction of almost any tax: it will hardly 
motivate consumers to see the tax as a quid pro quo. For this reason, the 
commission, in its most recent communication, has actually shelved plans for the 
introduction of an EU communication tax for the near future, stating that “the 
justifications for the communications tax seem rather blurred” (European 
Commission 2011b, 145).8 This could change however, with the introduction of 
the planned European policy on information and communication technologies;9 
                                                 
8
 At present the European Commission (2011a) emphasizes an EU financial transaction tax and a 
new VAT resource as two possible new own resources of the Union. Both together would supply 
40 percent of the EU budget in 2020. 
9
 “A fully functioning single market depends on modern, high performing infrastructure 
connecting Europe particularly in the areas of transport, energy and information and 
communication technologies (ICT)” (European Commission 2011a, 14). The role of the 
commercial Internet providers as willingly cooperating with the creation of one internal market 
should not be taken for granted. A single internal market not only has the advantage that national 
Internet providers can more easily go abroad, but also that they have more overseas competitors. 
This has historically always been a reason for firms to ask for protective measures. Therefore, the 
willingness to create the one internal market by all providers should not be taken for granted. The 
gains for the consumers and other businesses, however, are huge. Next to increased choice for 
consumers, the spurring of innovation by providers, the overall prices in telecommunications 
(relative to the consumer price index) have declined by 23 percent over the period 1996–2000 
(European Commission 2002a, 115). In total, the growth attributable to the liberalization of the 
telecom market has been 0.4 percent of total national income (European Commission 2002b), 
although this figure is in a sense a guess since the counterfactual—the non-existence of an internal 
market—is hard to specify in time. For these problems see the ex post estimate of the effects of the 
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without financial help from the Union, paid by a European Communication Tax, 
the envisioned “modern, high performing infrastructure” is unlikely to come 
about. As the Commission has observed, “National budgets will never give 
sufficiently high priority to multi-country, cross-border investments to equip the 
Single Market with the infrastructure it needs” (European Commission 2011a, 14). 
In the next MFF, for the years 2014–2020, the Commission is proposing a €9 
billion investment for the creation of digital networks.10 Since, at present, the 
Commission is under particular pressure from the public to show that belonging to 
the EU is of value to Member States and their citizens, the likelihood of the 
realization of the policy to create the wanted infrastructure after 2014 is high, 
given it is one of the best examples of the added value the EU can bring.11 If 
realized, the Union will indeed have earned a certain right to tax its citizens. 
The greatest disadvantage of a communication tax, particularly from a 
technical viewpoint, is that it is a new tax (cf. HLEG 1997) with a current 
sophistication of technical analysis equivalent to simply taxing telephone 
landlines.12 For example, Is the intention to tax emails sent to servers in Europe? 
From servers in Europe? Through servers in Europe? Or all three? Would 
Americans checking email while on vacation in Europe be subject to the tax? 
Moreover, who would collect the tax: ISPs or mobile operators? At present too, 
email messages, which are not currently counted on a per-unit basis like mobile 
phone text messages, would initially be more difficult to measure for taxation 
purposes. The only feasible way to tax email messages would probably be at the 
level of an ISP or service like Hotmail or Yahoo!, since they would be able to 
track traffic levels. In short, the fast-changing technological environment of 
Internet “telephone” services has been noted by the Commission but has not, to 
my knowledge, been analyzed for its consequences. This has consequences for the 
                                                                                                                                     
one internal market of Roeger and Sekkat (2002). For a much more positive ex ante estimate, see 
European Commission (1988). 
10
 For a preliminary list of proposed projects of broadband target areas and European digital 
service infrastructure corridors, see European Commission (2011c, 70). See European 
Commission (2011d, 74) for how the Union re-defines its role in promoting trans-European 
networks and how it wants to contribute to setting up the right conditions to boost investments and 
bridge remaining financial difficulties. 
11
 As also follows from footnote 10, it would be a false impression of the gains of an EU policy, to 
compare only the, in total, €9.2 billion for the next seven years, starting in 2014 on ICT/digital 
project for the one internal market of the EU with a tax, to be paid each year, of €25 billion. This, 
indeed, would look like a bad exchange for the consumer taxpayer. The financial quid pro quo, for 
the taxpayer, is much bigger in added growth, innovation, and (for example) fighting cybercrime 
(European Commission 2010b, 2011c).  
12
 However, the EU also cites newness as an advantage, given it avoids time-consuming 
harmonization; the requirement for a harmonization process explains why an EU corporate income 
tax scores low as a new EU tax. For the present VAT, the harmonization process has lasted more 
than 10 years, and is still incomplete. 
7
Leen: The Budget of the European Union and an Internet Communication Tax
fulfillment of the budgetary criteria mentioned above, given that cost-
effectiveness, stability, and the presumed growth of the revenues become 
speculative. These technical aspects of an Internet tax (as compared with other 
communication taxes) need to be assessed by the European Union. 
 
 
Implications for European Union Policy 
 
It would be easy for an Internet communication tax to fulfill the criteria of 
visibility, equity, and efficiency. Because of great uncertainty, however, the 
technical and budgetary criteria currently show overriding negative results that 
will be hard to overcome. In addition, and most importantly, the tax is not at 
present (from a political point of view) backed by EU policy. The EU intends to 
change this situation. 
An EU policy regarding Internet taxation can be a real added value for the 
Union, given that if the EU supplied real European collective goods, citizens 
would presumably feel connected with the EU, and be in favor of European taxes 
(Iozzo, Micossi, and Salvemini 2008). Others have observed, however, that since 
taxes are never popular, a visible EU tax might actually diminish support for the 
Union (Mutén 2001, 230). Because of the high costs involved, individual Member 
States would probably be reluctant to invest in digital communication 
infrastructure: an equitable result would therefore be to share the tax revenues 
between Member States and the Union.13  The diverse quality of national tax 
administrations would be less of a problem, since Member States have an 
incentive to collect the taxes in view of revenue sharing. Member States, too, 
would be motivated to contribute for this common policy, since they would get 
something in return. The problem of how to turn the juste retour thinking of the 
Member States and citizens to the EU’s advantage (Leen 2011) would perhaps 
therefore be solved by an EU Internet communication tax.14 If so, we would have 
come full circle. As Begg and Grimwade (1998, 137) stated after introducing the 
idea of a communication tax over a decade ago: “This new tax could well have 
the advantage of being more easy to project as an authentic ‘Euro-tax’.” If so, a 
                                                 
13
 Compare Lamassoure’s idea of a communication tax. In this idea, the tax proceeds of messages 
sent within a country would go to the national government, and those that cross borders to the 
Union. 
14
 At present, given the democratic deficit, to introduce EU taxes would not be an improvement. 
The current Parliament is not a real parliament, and the European Commission is not a real 
government. Hence, it is not to be expected that the EU could deliver a tax agreed on by the 
citizens. The suspicion is that a European tax will increase the autonomy of the EU, meaning that 
the Union would no longer have to beg for money from the Member States. Increased autonomy, 
however, in a democratic society, can never be an end in itself (Heinemann, Mohl, and Osterloh 
2008, 50). 
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communication tax—like the EU’s role in taxation—is set to become an 
important political and economic battleground in the future. 
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